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We use a simple Lotka-Volterra model of the disease transmission pro-
cess to analyse the dynamic population structure in two scenarios. Firstly
a vaccine is available on the market at a constant price through time. Sec-
ondly, the vaccine is publicly provided. The vaccine works either by giving
partial or full immunity to the disease. We analyse market provision for
vaccines providing partial immunity and public provision of both types of
vaccine.
Infectious diseases have been and are economically and socially costly. In
the UK in the 19th century 30% of deaths were caused by typhoid, tuberculosis
(TB) and typhus [13]. The World Health Organisation [18] estimates that TB
causes about three million deaths and eight million new infections per annum.
Vaccination against such diseases can either work to give full immunity imme-
diately following vaccination or can work to reduce the chance of infection. For
example, vaccines against polio, tetanus and diptheria appear to give certain
immunity. However, vaccination against cholera or malaria is problematic and
vaccination against hepatitis B leaves 10-15% of middle aged males unprotected
[5]. For analytical clarity, in this paper we classify vaccines as either giving full
and permanent immunity or as providing a reduction in the chance of infection
(partial immunity).
If vaccines are provided in a market system, then the individual incentive to
purchase the vaccine is driven by the trade-o¤ between its cost and the better
life chances that vaccination o¤ers. The higher the chance of infection and
the greater the cost of being infected, the greater the willingness to pay for
vaccination. It follows that the market demand for vaccination is sensitive to
the risk of infection, which itself is generally modelled as increasing with the
prevalence of the disease in the population. With a heterogeneous population
1(e.g. in incomes) the aggregate demand for the vaccine generally is a continuous
function of the prevalence of the disease and the e¤ectiveness of the vaccine.
Here the question is: what are the e¤ects of a market provided vaccine on the
dynamic health structure of the population?
Alternatively, if the vaccine is publicly provided, its e¤ects on control of the
disease depend on the form of the vaccination programme. Since the vaccine is
costly, scarcity of public resources prevents o¤ering the vaccine free to everybody
in unlimited quantities at all times. So the question is: with …nite resources to
fund vaccination, what time pro…le of publicly provided vaccination is best?
In earlier work Geo¤ard and Philipson [8] analyse market and publicly pro-
vided vaccination programmes in a Lotka-Volterra type predator prey model of
the population dynamics for the case of vaccine giving permanent immunity.
They show that in the unique stationary state the eradication of the disease is
unlikely to be achieved either under a market system for delivering vaccination
or under a public subsidy system. With an exogenously given constant path of
prices, they …nd that their system exhibits local stability of the nonzero station-
ary state rather than cycles. However, they exclusive focus on stationary states
so that the global dynamics escape investigation. Furthermore, they work with
preventive action which gives permanent immunity. Often this is inappropriate.
For example TB does not …t this pattern. Two main forms of TB exist: pul-
monary TB and extra-pulmonary TB, the former is most common and is the
only infectious form. In the case of TB, BCG vaccination has only a limited
e¤ect on controlling the spread of infectious TB [9], [11].
In this paper we analyse the e¤ects of market provided vaccines which o¤er
partial immunity to the disease through decreasing the chance of infection. In
this scenario we look at the stationary equilibria and also at the dynamics of the
population structure along non-stationary paths. We also analyse the dynamic
e¤ects of public vaccination policies for both the cases of vaccines giving full
immunity and vaccines giving partial immunity. Throughout the paper, the
dynamic population structure is governed by a variant of the Lotka-Volterra
type predator-prey model.
As we discuss in the sequel, the sort of diseases we have in mind are pul-
monary TB and polio when vaccination provides partial immunity and full im-
munity, respectively1.
In Section 1 we outline the disease model. To avoid the curse of dimension-
ality in analysing the dynamics we use a slightly di¤erent demographic charac-
terisation than Geo¤ard and Philipson [8] (in particular distinguishing only two
health states). In Section 2 we analyse the dynamics of the disease in a market
setting. In Section 3 we look at regulatory solutions to disease control including
targeted regulatory action.
The results indicate that when vaccination only o¤ers partial immunity to
infection, a market provided vaccine at a constant price leads to choices of
vaccination by individuals which may generate additional stationary states for
1This view of the uncertainty of the e¤ects of preventive activity is closer to Geo¤ard and
Philipson [7] although in that paper the emphasis is not on preventive policy. IUATLD [9],
Weatherall [14], WHO [15],[18].
2the population structure instead of the two stationary states which exist without
vaccination. We give an example which has three stationary points, two of which
are saddle points and the third a stable focus. The global phase space reveals
that in this example the population structure tends to settle down to either a
stable low healthy/low disease level or involves growth in both the numbers of
healthy and infected individuals.
Alternatively, if a dynamic subsidy policy is used to regulate vaccination then
we …nd that in the case of partial immunity, a procyclical policy, vaccinating at
instants when prevalence is high, is preferable to either a low prevalence policy
or a constant vaccination policy. In the case of vaccination giving full immunity
to infection, we …nd that a low prevalence subsidy policy is best. This result
holds both in demographic dynamics used in the bulk of our analysis and in the
demographic dynamics used by Geo¤ard and Philipson [8].
1 The Disease Process
Some epidemiological models distinguish many more states than this e.g. Ge-
o¤ard and Philipson [8] allow for four states (susceptible, infected, recovered
and out of the system). In the case of various strains of TB which di¤er in
the time gap between …rst infection and becoming actively infected and infec-
tious (so called fast and slow TB), there may be …ve states (susceptible, latent
slow infected, latent fast infected, active infected, recovered). [14] The nature
of recovery can also be heterogeneous: infected individuals who have recovered
either may have permanent immunity from the disease forming a class of their
own or may immediately become susceptible to a new attack of the disease join-
ing the existing group of susceptibles2. The population changes through time
due to the births of the susceptible class (one cannot be born either a latent or
active infected individual; nor as a recovered individual) and to deaths either
from natural old age or from the disease.
Historically outbreaks of disease have generally followed an epidemic pattern.
For example a common occurrence in medieval England was for a geographical
area to succumb to an outburst of plague over a period of …ve months or so, often
concentrated at particular times of year, but then the disease would die away,
subsequently breaking out again. To some extent this was due to the particular
parasitic transmission mechanism. However, partly it was due to the type of
dynamic interaction seen in the very simplest predator-prey models which we
use here. It follows that a very common paradigm for modelling the disease
dynamics is a simple version of the Lotka-Volterra system which combines the
latent and the susceptible individuals3 and ignores the recovered individuals.
We think of a population Nt of individuals in a given area at instant t.
Individuals can be in one of two health states: susceptible and latent or actively
infected and infectious.
2Chan-Yeung [3], Comstock [4], IUATLD [9], Weatherall, D. J. et al. [14].
3This is justi…ed since TB has a short incubation period of TB and only 10% of the latents
develop the disease in active form.
3Nt = Xt + Yt (1)
½ _ Xt = ®Xt ¡ ¯XtYt
_ Yt = ¯XtYt ¡ !Yt
(2)
where Xt is the stock of susceptibles at time t and Yt is the stock of actively
infected at t. Furthermore, ® is the net birth rate of susceptibles (birth rate mi-
nus death rate due to non-disease causes) and ! is the death rate of the actively
infected whether through the disease or natural causes. The probability that
a susceptible person becomes infected is represented by ¯Yt so that the total
number of new infections is ¯XtYt. The probability of infection re‡ects preva-
lence of the disease, the frequency of interaction between individuals (density
dependent e¤ect) and the virulence of the disease.






Y t = ®Xt ¡ !Yt (3)
that is, the di¤erence between the net birth rate of the susceptibles and the
combined deaths of the latent and actively infected individuals. This system
has two stationary points:
X¤
1 = Y ¤
1 = 0 (4)
X¤
2 = !=¯; Y ¤
2 = ®=¯ (5)
The …rst corresponds to extinction and the second to a constant population
level and structure. There are no steady growth paths of the system i.e. no paths
along which total population is growing at a constant rate and the population
structure is constant. Essentially this is because the di¤erential equations are
not homogeneous of degree one in the levels of the variables due to the product
term XtYt. That is, if the population initially doubles in each class (Xt;Yt)
the number of new infections quadruples. There is a built in tendency for
more populous societies to face larger ‡uctuations in the health structure of the
population.
As is well known, the second stationary point (5) has two pure imaginary
roots so long as ® > 0 so that there are closed cycles about this stationary point.
Notice that if ® ￿ 0 then we lose the centre as a viable stationary state. In
this case the healthy just decay to zero through the combined e¤ects of natural
death and infection by the infected individuals. It is less well known that the
origin is locally a saddle point. A typical phase diagram is shown in Fig. 1.
4Figure 1: Phase plane for system (2)
2 Marketed Vaccination Providing Partial Im-
munity
With market provision, a preventive device is available at a price p at time t:
The vaccine works by reducing ¯, the risk of infection. In this case for each
susceptible there would be a di¤erent level of ¯ depending on whether that
susceptible has been vaccinated or not. There are two levels of ¯, ¯H and
¯L (¯H > ¯L). Individual choice of vaccination or not is based on utility
maximisation. Each susceptible individual i has income mi that can be spent on
consumption ci or on vaccination at a relative price of p. For the ith susceptible
if u(hi;ci) represents utility with health status hi (hi is either infected I or
susceptible S) and is assumed strictly concave and increasing in ci, expected
utility of a susceptible i, who has constant income mi and has vaccinated, is
¯LYtu(I;mi ¡ p) + (1 ¡ ¯LYt)u(S;mi ¡ p) (6)
without vaccination at t or earlier it is
¯HYtu(I;mi) + (1 ¡ ¯HYt)u(S;mi) (7)
Vaccination costs forgone consumption but gives more favourable odds be-
tween the good and bad state. Susceptible i vaccinates if he/she gains expected
utility from doing so.
Given that expected utility depends on current prevalence Yt and the cost of
the vaccine p, individual i would be more likely to vaccinate the higher is current
5prevalence and the lower the vaccine price. Since the e¤ect of vaccination is
to alter the risk of infection faced by the individual, then the average risk of
infection varies with the proportion of vaccinated individuals. It follows that
we can write ¯ = ¯(p;Yt).
The number of new infections is then ¯(p;Yt)XtYt where ¯(p;Yt) is decreas-
ing in Yt and increasing in p. The population structure evolves according to
½ _ Xt = ®Xt ¡ ¯(pt;Yt)XtYt
_ Yt = ¯(pt;Yt)XtYt ¡ !Yt
(8)
If prices and incomes are constant through time then e¤ectively we can write
¯ = ¯(Yt):4 The origin is always one stationary state of (8). There are generally
other stationary states. Since at Y = 0, ¯(Y )Y = 0 we know that the origin
is the unique stationary state if ¯(Y )Y is bounded above by ®. However, if it
is not, then the number of nonzero stationary states depends on the number
of turning points in ¯(Y )Y . Since the sign of the derivative of ¯(Y )Y is given
by (1 + ± ln(¯Y )=± lnY ), if the elasticity is either bounded above or below by
j1j, then the function is monotonic and there is at most one nonzero stationary
point solving
® = ¯(Y ¤)Y ¤; ! = ¯(Y ¤)X¤
Otherwise, there may be more than one nonzero stationary state each solving
® = ¯(Y ¤)Y ¤(yielding Y ¤) and ! = ¯(Y ¤)X¤ (which then gives X¤)5. Gen-
erally the prevalence dependence of ¯ a¤ects the stability of the system. As
@¯=@Y < 0 in the neighbourhood of non-zero stationary state, then locally
the stationary state has at least one direction of stability (the trace of the Ja-
cobian of the dynamical system evaluated at the nonzero-stationary point is
!(@ ln¯=@ lnY ) < 0): If locally the elasticity of ¯ with respect to Y is less
than ¡1, then locally it also has a direction of instability and is a saddle (the
4Alternatively we could derive the price and prevalence dependence of ¯ from a dynamic
programming approach as Geo¤ard and Philipson [8] do. If vaccination at any t gives a
permanent change in risks of infection then we can interpret the utilities in lifetime terms.
From t onwards let
Vt(Yt;v) = ¯LYtu(I;mi ¡ p) + (1 ¡ ¯LYt)u(S;mi ¡ p) + Vt+1(Yt+1;v) (9)
Vt(Yt;nv) = ¯HYtu(I;mi) + (1 ¡ ¯HYt)u(S;mi) + maxfVt+1(Yt+1;v);Vt+1(Yt+1;nv)g
(10)
be the value functions of a susceptible who has not vaccinated prior to t and who respectively
decides to either vaccinate Vt(Yt;v) or not vaccinate Vt(Yt;nv) in t. Here i vaccinates in t if
Vt(Yt;v) > Vt(Yt;nv). This comparison again gives us a critical income level de…ned in terms
of the vaccine price and the current prevalence, together with expected future prevalences and
future economic variables at which a susceptible is just indi¤erent between vaccination or not.
5There may be several solutions to the equation ® = ¯(Y )Y: If ¯(0) > 0 and the elasticity
of ¯(Y ) with respect to Y < ¡1 then there is a unique solution since then ¯(Y )Y is decreasing.
It is plausible that ¯(Y )Y has a minimum in which case there are likely to be at least two
interior solutions for Y:
6sign of the determinant is that of [@ ln¯=@ lnY + 1]). This is in contrast to
the Geo¤ard and Phillipson [8] model6 in which the unique non-zero stationary
state is locally stable. Since each individual neglects the risk of future infection
which he imposes on other susceptibles through not vaccinating, the results are
not Pareto optimal. Issues of market failure arising from this externality are
discussed in Brito et al. [[2]].
To illustrate some of the dynamic possibilities with multiple stationary points
we present an example in which we numerically integrate the nonlinear di¤eren-
tial equations. The phase spaces are globally accurate, the linear approximations
would just give us the local dynamics in the vicinity of the di¤erent stationary
states.
To show this, in (8) we select ® = 0:05, ¯(Yt) = 0:2 ¡ 0:1Yt and ! = 0:05.
This has three stationary points at X¤
1 = Y ¤
1 = 0 which is a saddle point,
X¤
2 = Y ¤
2 = 0:38 (which has a stationary state level ¯(Y ) = 0:13), which is a
convergent focal point and X¤
3 = Y ¤
3 = 0:73 (which has a stationary state level
¯(Y ¤) = 0:07) which is also a saddle point. The eigenvalues corresponding to
the stable focus are [¡0:13 § 0:32i]; around the saddle point with X¤
3 = Y ¤
3
positive, the eigenvalues are [0:02; ¡0:12].
The global view of the phase space for these parameter values is in Fig. 2.
In this example the e¤ect of marketed vaccination is to yield a system with
three stationary states rather than the two stationary states in the basic Lotka-
Volterra demographic system. In the vaccination model, there are asymptoti-
cally …ve types of behaviour for the population structure. It may tend to the
stable focus or converge along the stable separatrix to the higher saddle point
(if the initial conditions are on the stable separatrix). It may diverge away from
the higher saddle point with both Xt and Yt growing or travel down the verti-
cal axis (the stable separatrix of the origin) or move outwards from the origin
along the horizontal axis (the unstable separatrix of the origin). Which of these
events occurs depends on the initial conditions. The e¤ect is that either there
ultimately is a stable population with a constant structure or total population
is growing but with the numbers of healthy rising faster than the numbers of
sick. In this last case the system follows an approximately linear path in the
[X ¡ Y ] plane.
3 Regulatory Policy
Policy can act through targeted programmes of prevention. If there is an e¤ec-
tive vaccine providing permanent immunity then providing vaccine free to all,
6It follows that the dynamic pattern is not robust to the epidemiological model. If for
example we used the Geo¤ard and Philipson [8] model of demographics we would have
￿




for the Jacobian of the dynamic system. The determinant of this is ¯2XY which generally is
positive.
7Figure 2: Phase plane for market provided vaccine
and ensuring that it is taken up by all, can eliminate the disease as suscepti-
bles will always choose to take a vaccine o¤ered at zero cost. As this may be
prohibitively costly, the question of the most e¤ective vaccination policy arises.
Geo¤ard and Philipson [8] consider the e¤ect on the steady state of their
model of a continuous constant price subsidy to the vaccine.
In contrast we examine the dynamic e¤ects of dynamic rules for applying a
subsidy on any solution path. Here, the issue we wish to focus on is the optimal
timing of the vaccine. In the scenarios we envisage above, all susceptibles are
medically identical so on medical grounds there is no reason to distinguish them.
However, a given public budget for vaccination may have quite di¤erent e¤ects
if it is all spent at once either in a period with high prevalence (giving a shift
in the aggregate risk of infection in the period in which it is administered) or in
a period with low prevalence or if it is spent at a constant rate through time.
We continue to assume
(
_ Xt = ®Xt ¡ ¯XtYt :
Y t = ¯XtYt ¡ !Yt
(12)
In the absence of any policy the transmission coe¢cient ¯ takes the value
¯H. However, if the vaccine gives partial immunity, a public policy of complete
coverage of the susceptibles by vaccination leads to a step change in ¯ from ¯H
to ¯L.
If the vaccine provides permanent immunity then, similarly to [8], vaccina-
tion works by reducing the number of susceptibles at any instant where it is
applied.
As examples we take three cases:
8(i) the vaccine is administered along any path satisfying (12) only in periods
of low prevalence when Yt < (®=!)Xt;
(ii) the vaccine is administered along any path satisfying (12) only in periods
of high prevalence when Yt > (®=!)Xt
7;
(iii) the vaccine is administered at a constant rate independently of preva-
lence.
3.1 The Partial Immunity Case
With the vaccine giving partial immunity, the e¤ect is to alter ¯. The idea is
that susceptibles may either be vaccinated (in this case they face ¯L) or not (in
this case the infection risk is ¯H). If Xv and Xnv are, respectively, the numbers









To de…ne an idea of equivalent shifts in ¯ we assume there is a …xed lump
sum budget of M and an interest rate of r. The budget can either be spent
all in one period: if spent in period t, ertM is available; if spent at a constant
rate, then per period M=r can be spent; if spent at a constant rate, K over the
interval [T1;T2] e.g. corresponding to a sequence of periods of high prevalence
an amount
K = (erT2 ¡ erT1)=[r(T2 ¡ T1)] (14)
is available. Generally ¯t is some decreasing function of mt, vaccine spending
in instant t.
For given funds continuous vaccination gives a lower e¤ect on ¯ at each
instant than intermittent bouts of vaccination at the instants of vaccination. So
if we can show that a given change in ¯ at instants of vaccination is preferable
when ¯ is adjusted intermittently rather than continuously, then we are sure that
intermittent is better than continuous vaccination. Any vaccination policy of
this form shifts the nonzero stationary point along the ray Y = ®=!X increasing
both X¤ and Y ¤ by shifting from ¯ to a lower value ¹ ¯.
To analyse intermittent vaccination consider a ”high prevalence” vaccination
policy where vaccination is undertaken whenever Yt > ®=!Xt. The e¤ect is
that, in some parts of the region where Yt > ®=!Xt, the gradient …eld changes
when the policy switches on. In the region de…ned by ®=¹ ¯ > Yt > ®=¯ and
!=¯ < Xt < !=¹ ¯ the direction switches from one of rising Yt and falling Xt In
the region de…ned by ®=¹ ¯ > Yt > ®=¯ and Xt < !=¯ the direction of movement
7As will be clear from the subsequent dynamic analysis, this particular de…nition of high
and low prevalence is not crucial to the results. What matters is that the degree of prevalence
is de…ned in terms of Y=X:
9switches from one of falling Xt and Yt to one of falling Yt and rising Xt. When
!=¯ < Xt < !=¹ ¯ and Yt > ®=¹ ¯ the direction switches from increasing Yt and
falling Xt to one of falling Yt and falling Xt. Combining these changes with the
direction of movement in other areas of the phase space gives the …nal result
of the high prevalence policy (Fig. 3). The e¤ects are that the ray Y = ®=!X
develops some stability properties. On a path which approaches the ray at a
point between !=¯ and !=¹ ¯ the policy switches force the path to oscillate in a
small neighbourhood of the ray with the policy continuously being switched on
and o¤. E¤ectively the policy has eliminated the epidemic cycle in the original
path. However, on a path which approaches the ray at Xt < !=¯ there may
initially be an oscillatory period before the path again settles down in a small
neighbourhood of the ray. It follows that depending on the initial conditions
the high prevalence policy leads to a nearly stationary population structure in
the long run with a ratio ®=! of infected individuals.
A constant policy for the same cost gives a constant ~ ¯ with ¯ > ~ ¯ > ¹ ¯. For
the same initial condition the permanent fall in ¯ switches the system from a low
amplitude cycle around the original stationary point to a new high amplitude
cycle around the new higher population level stationary point. The policy has
actually increased the ‡uctuations in the system. Fig. 4 shows a closed cycle
in the pre-policy phase together with a closed cycle in the post-policy phase. If
the policy is introduced when the system is at a point like A, then for ever after
the system follows the new closed cycle starting at A.
We could also consider a low prevalence policy. This might be thought
sensible if a big push when the disease is unimportant can actually eliminate
it. The idea is to vaccinate when Yt < ®=!Xt. Similar consideration of the
gradient …eld shows that this policy will be destabilising leading to an unstable
spiral that is outside both stationary points. Fig. 5 portrays such an unstable
path.
For the same economic cost the high prevalence policy appears preferable
as it eliminates ‡uctuations leading to a near constant population structure.
Furthermore, the system settles down to a population level that depends on the
initial conditions. That is with vaccination working through ¯ the procyclical
policy a¤ects the whole dynamic path of the population favourably.
3.2 The Full Immunity Case
Where the vaccine gives permanent immunity Geo¤ard and Phillipson examine
the steady state e¤ect of a public subsidy on the price of a market provided vac-
cine. They …nd that since the steady state prevalence of the disease is increasing
with the price, an increase in the steady state subsidy (and so a decrease in the
price) has a direct e¤ect in raising steady state demand for the vaccine but,
since it reduces steady state prevalence, an indirect e¤ect in reducing demand
via prevalence.
In our framework a relatively simple way of modelling the permanent immu-
nity case is to assume that, when vaccination policy is in force, some of the net
growth of susceptibles is diverted into immune individuals i.e. the policy works
10Figure 3: Phase plane for high prevalence policy - partial immunity
Figure 4: Phase plane with constant vaccination policy - partial immunity
11Figure 5: Phase plane for low prevalence policy - partial immunity
Figure 6: Phase plane for intermittent policy - full immunity
12Figure 7: Phase plane for high prevalence policy - full immunity
Figure 8: Phase plane for low prevalence policy - full immunity
13Figure 9: Amplitude of low prevalence policy - full immunity
through reducing ®. Without the policy the net growth of susceptibles is ®;
with the vaccination policy it is ¹ ® < ®: The e¤ect is that when the vaccination
programme is active, the system has a stationary state that is vertically below
that corresponding to inactive vaccination (i.e. ¹ Y ¤ = ¹ ®=¯ < ®=¯ = Y ¤) as in
Fig. 6: When the policy is active the system is following orbits around the lower
stationary state; when inactive it follows orbits around the higher stationary
state.
If we apply this policy in periods of high prevalence, again de…ned as Yt >
®=!Xt, the e¤ect is to create an unstable spiral. Starting from a path with
the policy o¤, as soon as the ray Yt = ®=!Xt is reached, the path switches
to an orbit around the new stationary point. The new orbit intersects the ®=!
ray closer to the origin than the original orbit thus increasing the amplitude of
movement8. On reaching the ray again from above, the policy is turned o¤ and
8By de…ning w(¿) = ¯=!x(®t);z(¿) = ¯=®y(®t) and using primes to denote di¤erentiation
with respect to ¿; (2) becomes w0(¿) = w(¿)(1¡z(¿)) and z0(¿) = (!=®)z(¿)(w(¿)¡1): This
system has an interior stationary point at w¤ = z¤ = 1. For any initial condition, the equation
for the closed orbit in phase space is w ¡ ln(w) + ®=!(z ¡ ln(z)) = C where C is a constant
determined by initial conditions. High prevalence is de…ned by z ¸ w: On any given orbit,
the two points of the orbit that are on the 45o line are the roots of w ¡ ln(w) = !C=(® + !):
Now take two systems: the no vaccination system with ® and the vaccination system with
¹ ® < ®: Select an arbitrary orbit from the no vaccination system and …nd the higher root
where this orbit crosses the 45o line; say at w0: At w0 start travelling along the orbit of
the vaccination system; this new orbit will cross the 45o line at points w1 which satisfy
[w1 ¡ ln(w1)][1 + ¹ ®=!] = C
= [w0 ¡ ln(w0)][1 + ®=!]:
As ¹ ® < ® and w ¡ ln(w) is a convex function with a minimum, the two roots in the
vaccination system are each below the corresponding root in the no vaccination system.
14the path switches on to a new orbit about the original stationary point which
lies outside the starting orbit. Continuing in this way produces an asymmetric
unstable spiral. If we look at the phase diagram combining the two switches we
get Fig. 7. Here we can only see the no vaccination stationary state. The lower
stationary state and orbits close to it and below the ray never occur because
the policy is switched o¤ there. However, a low prevalence policy will generate
quite complex dynamics with two nonzero stationary states and also the part of
the ray Y = ®=!X becomes a region of attraction so that once in the vicinity of
this part of the ray the system oscillates between the vaccination policy being
on and o¤. Fig. 8 shows simultaneous operations of the two systems. Note
that there is an orbit around the lower vaccination stationary point that is just
tangent to the ®=! ray, say where Y = Y ¤: If the system ever reaches a point
on the ray between Y = Y ¤ and Y = ®=¯ then it remains at that point. Again
because orbits around the vaccination stationary state cross the ray closer to
the origin than orbits around the no vaccination stationary state for the same
initial conditions, there is a generic pattern of a stable cycle which converges to
some point in the region of attraction of the ray. Typically, the low prevalence
policy leaves roughly the same amplitude ‡uctuations in Xt but passes through
a region of values of Yt lower than without the policy (Fig. 9).
The low prevalence vaccination policy can also be considered preferable
within the Geo¤ard and Phillipson demographic structure. For given demo-
graphic parameters there is a unique stable stationary state to the system
½ _ Xt = ® ¡ ¯(Xt;Yt)XtYt
_ Yt = ¯(Xt;Yt)XtYt ¡ !Yt
(15)
at X¤ = !=¯;Y ¤ = ®=! (see Fig. 10): Vaccination works again to reduce ® to ¹ ®
so that in the system with vaccination there is again a unique stable stationary
state at the same level of susceptibles but a lower level of infected. An example
of the two systems together is shown in Fig. 11. If a high prevalence policy is
used (vaccinate whenever Yt > ®¯Xt=!2) then the system cannot converge to
the lower vaccination stationary state since in an open region about this sta-
tionary point the system is following the dynamics of the no vaccination system.
The high prevalence policy system thus either converges to the no vaccination
stationary state or follows a closed cycle that includes this stationary state in
its interior (Fig. 12). However, a low prevalence policy gives the opportunity
of converging to the vaccination policy stationary state. Indeed paths must
converge to one of the two stationary states since both dynamic systems are
stable and trajectories always diminish in amplitude (they ”point inwards”). If
eventually a trajectory enters a phase where the vaccination policy is in e¤ect
that keeps the path below the ray Yt = ®¯Xt=!2, then the dynamics of the
vaccination system are in force at every instant and so the system converges to
the stationary state of the vaccination system. Otherwise, the path converges
to the no vaccination stationary state (Fig. 13). Thus with the demographic
dynamics of (15) the low prevalence policy is preferable in that there is no risk
of a closed cycle and a positive chance of attaining the stationary state of a
vaccinated population with a lower prevalence of the disease.
15Figure 10: Low prevalence policy in Geo¤ard and Phillipson’s framework
We conclude that generally in both of the demographic systems considered
the emphasis on procyclical vaccination policy has desirable e¤ects when the
vaccination does not give permanent immunity but that countercyclical policy
is better if the vaccine does give permanent immunity. This is in contrast to
Geo¤ard and Phillipson’s steady state analysis. Obviously the desirability of
any of these policies also depends on the opportunity cost of the public funds.
4 Conclusions
We use a similar demographic structure to that of Geo¤ard-Phillipson [8] and
start by analysing the stationary states and dynamic paths of market provided
vaccines that o¤er a reduction in the chance of infection from the disease. The
economic incentive for the individual to take vaccination is similar to that of
the permanent immunity case analysed by Geo¤ard-Phillipson. However, in the
partial immunity case we …nd that there may be more stationary states and that
the ”extra” stationary state is locally a saddlepoint. This is in addition to the
stationary states of extinction and of a low level of the population which, like
Geo¤ard-Phillipson, gives a stable focus. The e¤ect is that in more populous
societies with a fair proportion of infection the population may grow, with both
the healthy and infected groups growing. This can also happen if initially there
is a low population with a high proportion of infected and infectious individu-
als. We conclude that in our framework vaccines o¤ering partial immunity and
provided through a market system can control the disease su¢ciently to pre-
16Figure 11: Geo¤ard and Phillipson’s framework with and without the low preva-
lence policy
Figure 12: Geo¤ard and Phillipson’s framework with high prevalence policy
17Figure 13: Geo¤ard and Phillipson’s framework low prevalence policy
vent extinction but have elements of instability. The dynamic pattern is more
complex than in the case of vaccines o¤ering permanent immunity.
When vaccines are publicly provided through possibly time varying policies
we …nd that the e¤ects of di¤erent policies varies a lot with the form of the vac-
cine. Firstly, we compare alternative policies in the context of vaccination that
gives partial immunity. We …nd that if the criterion function depends mainly on
control of the absolute number of infected or on the system being stable and not
exhibiting epidemics, then a high prevalence policy (i.e. vaccinate when preva-
lence is high) is generally more e¢cient than vaccination at a steady rate which
is more e¢cient in turn than vaccination when prevalence of the disease is low.
Secondly, in the full immunity case where vaccination works to control the net
growth rate of the susceptible population, we …nd that a high prevalence policy
generates instability whereas it is now the low prevalence policy that leads to
reduced ‡uctuations in the population structure. This conclusion extends to
the demographic dynamics used by Geo¤ard and Phillipson [8].
We have found that vaccination has important e¤ects on the dynamic struc-
ture of the health status of the population. Moreover, some of the e¤ects are
sensitive to the forms that the disease and the vaccination takes. Of course
vaccination is not the only means of disease control. Historically, segrega-
tion/quarantine and also the e¤ects of economic growth/public health on the
social infrastructure have been important.
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